Friday, May 8, 2015

Scientists Crack A 50-Year-Old Mystery About The Measles Vaccine

NPR
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Back in the 1960s, the U.S. started vaccinating kids for measles. As expected, children stopped getting measles.
But something else happened.
Childhood deaths from all infectious diseases plummeted. Even deaths from diseases like pneumonia and diarrhea were cut by half.
Scientists saw the same phenomenon when the vaccine came to England and parts of Europe. And they see it today when developing countries introduce the vaccine.
"In some developing countries, where infectious diseases are very high, the reduction in mortality has been up to 80 percent," saysMichael Mina, a postdoc in biology at Princeton University and a medical student at Emory University.
"So it's really been a mystery — why do children stop dying at such high rates from all these different infections following introduction of the measles vaccine," he says.
Mina and his colleagues think they now might have an explanation. And theypublished their evidence Thursday in the journal Science.
Now there's an obvious answer to the mystery: Children who get the measles vaccine are probably more likely to get better health care in general — maybe more antibiotics and other vaccines. And it's true, health care in the U.S. has improved since the 1960s.
But Mina and his colleagues have found there's more going on than that simple answer.
The team obtained epidemiological data from the U.S., Denmark, Wales and England dating back to the 1940s. Using computer models, they found that the number of measles cases in these countries predicted the number of deaths from other infections two to three years later.
"We found measles predisposes children to all other infectious diseases for up to a few years," Mina says.
And the virus seems to do it in a sneaky way.
Like many viruses, measles is known to suppress the immune system for a few weeks after an infection. But previous studies in monkeys have suggested that measles takes this suppression to a whole new level: It erases immune protection to other diseases, Mina says.
So what does that mean? Well, say you get the chicken pox when you're 4-years-old. Your immune system figures out how to fight it. So you don't get it again. But if you get measles when you're 5-years-old, it could wipe out the memory of how to beat back the chicken pox. It's like the immune system has amnesia, Mina says.
"The immune system kind of comes back. The only problem is that it has forgotten what it once knew," he says.
So after an infection, a child's immune system has to almost start over, rebuilding its immune protection against diseases it has already seen before.
This idea of "immune amnesia" is still just a hypothesis and needs more testing, says epidemiologist William Moss, who has studied the measles vaccine for more than a decade at Johns Hopkins University.
But the new study, he says, provides "compelling evidence" that measles affects the immune system for two to three years. That's much longer than previously thought.
"Hence the reduction in overall child mortality that follows measles vaccination is much greater than previously believed," says Moss, who wasn't involved in the study.
That finding should give parents more motivation to vaccinate their kids, he says. "I think this paper will provide additional evidence — if it's needed — of the public health benefits of measles vaccine," Moss says. "That's an important message in the U.S. right now and in countries continuing to see measles outbreaks."
Because if the world can eliminate measles, it will help protect kids from many other infections, too.



Thursday, May 7, 2015

The next plague: How many mutations are we away from disaster?

Dangerous viruses lurk all around us. Discover whether one could turn into an unstoppable killer that could wipe out half the human race
Are we a few mutations away from disaster? (Image: Tina Berning)
OCTOBER 2014. The World Health Organization warns that there could soon be more than 10,000 new Ebola cases in west Africa every week. "We either stop Ebola now – or we face an entirely unprecedented situation for which we do not have a plan," declares the head of the UN response team. As pictures of the dead lying in the streets race round the world, many fear a runaway pandemic of Hollywood proportions.
In the US, these fears reach fever pitch after a man who had just returned from Liberia dies of Ebola. A teacher who stayed in a hotel 10 miles away from the hospital where the man was treated is told to stay away from school just because she'd been in the same town. A busload of passengers is quarantined when a woman vomits after getting off.
Six months on, the picture is very different. Ebola has faded from the headlines. With belated help from around the world, the outbreak has been contained, if not yet eradicated. In total, just over 10,000 people have died – an awful toll but hardly comparable to the Spanish flu of 1918, which killed around 50 million, or the Black Death, which wiped out half the population of Europe in the 14th century.
The fact that Ebola sparked such panic is perhaps more a reflection of our appetite for books and movies featuring catastrophic plagues than reality. But are those scenarios pure fiction? Are we now advanced enough to beat the worst that nature can throw at us? Or have we just been lucky? Are there viruses out there that are just a few mutations away from becoming unstoppable killers that really could wipe out half the human race?

Killing potential

Four factors determine the severity of any disease outbreak, says epidemiologist Christophe Fraser of Imperial College London: how deadly it is; how easily it spreads from person to person; if and how long a person is infectious before symptoms appear; and whether it can be prevented by vaccines, treatments or both. Diseases can wreak havoc even if they have only some of these traits, but it is the ones that score highly on most or all of them that we really need to worry about.
Looked at this way, Ebola is less fearsome than it first appears. True, it is deadly, killing more than half the people it infects, and no vaccine is yet available. But it doesn't score highly on the other factors. It isn't easily transmitted, as it only spreads via direct contact with body fluids. And people are not infectious until they start showing symptoms, so they can be isolated or quarantined before passing on the disease to others.
Ebola was therefore never likely to rampage out of control in rich countries. It managed to infect so many people this time round only because of poor healthcare, and because people did not know how to stop it spreading, says Derek Smith of the University of Cambridge, who studies emerging infectious diseases. Once well-established protocols were in place, it was quickly contained even in some of the poorest countries in the world.
If the Ebola virus mutates to become airborne, it would become more of a threat – but most virologists think such a change is unlikely. The virus would have to undergo major changes, such as being able to bind to and infect the cells lining the upper airway.
And even when viruses can spread via the air, they do not necessarily run riot. In 2002, for instance, people in China began to die of what was called Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome. SARS was better at spreading than Ebola, andairborne transmission was implicated in at least one cluster of cases. Within months it had reached dozens of countries, infecting around 8000 people and killing about a fifth of them.
Crucially, though, it scored low on factor three: symptoms appeared before people became infectious, so they could be quarantined before they began spreading the virus. This, along with the rapid discovery of the virus and how it spreads, stopped the outbreak within a year. "Most virologists think modern science and public health measures stopped a global and very serious SARS pandemic," says Smith.
There is one deadly virus that scores very highly on factor three: people with HIV are infectious for years before symptoms appear. This has enabled the virus to spread around the world and kill around 36 million people, even though it is very poor at spreading from person to person.
H1N1 swine flu, by contrast, spreads with ease. It is contagious for about a day before symptoms appear, and when it first emerged in 2009 no vaccines were available. Over half the world's population was probably infected within the first year, says Smith. Thankfully, the strain was not much more lethal than normal flu, although it was more likely to hit younger people hard.

Seven billion hosts

So none of the diseases that have emerged recently ticks all the boxes in Fraser's four-point profile of the perfect killer (see graphic). Have we just been lucky? Could such a pathogen emerge in the future?
Public health advances have undoubtedly helped prevent emerging diseases like SARS and Ebola killing many millions. Yet in other ways, we are more vulnerable than ever before. There are now 7 billion of us on Earth – an awful lot of potential hosts for a pathogen to exploit. And thanks to air travel, diseases can spread around the world faster than ever.
There is certainly no shortage of viruses waiting in the wings. Diseases like Ebola are caused by viruses that live in animals jumping into humans: bats are thought to be Ebola's natural host. And it's estimated that mammals alone play host to hundreds of thousands of unknown viruses.
We already know that a few are capable of killing people given half a chance. The Nipah virus, for instance, was first identified in Malaysia in 1998 after killing 105 people. Should we be concerned about these kinds of viruses? Definitely, says Ron Fouchier of the Erasmus Medical Centre in Rotterdam, the Netherlands, who helped identify SARS. "Perhaps they could acquire the ability to sustain transmission between people. We don't know."
It's a close relative of SARS that is keeping many virologists awake at night at the moment. MERS, or Middle East Respiratory Syndrome, emerged in Saudi Arabia in 2012. It keeps jumping into people from some animal host, possibly camels. It has infected around 1000 people and killed 400. Fortunately, it rarely spreads from person to person, but the more people it infects, the more opportunities it will have to evolve this ability.
Even if MERS never starts spreading from person to person, another animal virus is certain to at some point. If we don't stamp on these emerging diseases quickly, as we did with SARS, a global pandemic could result.
The good news, though, is that it is unlikely that an animal virus jumping into humans could instantly acquire the four traits of a perfect killer. In particular, they are usually poor at spreading from person to person. The viruses that spread most readily in people, like the cold-causing rhinovirus, have evolved this ability over countless generations of plaguing our ancestors. And as viruses get better at spreading, they tend to become less deadly – although this may not always be true.
But there is one virus that might be able to acquire all four traits almost instantaneously: flu. New strains of human flu already tick almost all the boxes: they spread readily from person to person, are infectious for at least a day before symptoms appear, and it takes six months to a year to make a vaccine. The one trait they lack is deadliness. By contrast, some animal strains of flu, such as the H5N1 bird flu that emerged in 1996, are extremely deadly when they manage to infect people but very rarely pass from one person to another.
Influenza viruses not only have a high mutation rate, they also have a nifty trick up their sleeve: they can "reassort". The flu genome consists of eight pieces of RNA. When two different flu strains infect the same cell, their progeny can have a mixture of RNAs from both strains – and thus a mixture of their characteristics. "At least three out of four pandemics of the last century emerged upon reassortment of flu viruses in humans or pigs," says Fouchier.
So the crucial question is whether mutation, reassortment or both could create a form of flu that combines the deadliness of some bird flu strains with the infectiousness of the strains that circulate in people. Such a virus would be a colossal threat, capable of killing on a catastrophic scale. This is what Fouchier and others have been trying to find out.
In 2012, after tinkering with the H5N1 virus and seeing if they could infect ferrets, he and his colleagues announced that with just a few mutations in two genes, the H5N1 bird flu strain might be able to spread readily in humans. First, the virus would have to become capable of binding to receptors on epithelial cells in our upper respiratory tract. In most viruses, such as Ebola, this requires major changes, but with bird flu only minor tweaks will do it. Second, it would have to be able to replicate effectively at a lower temperature, because the human upper respiratory tract is cooler than the gut of the bird. Altogether just five mutations might do the trick – and there are other strains of H5N1 out there that already have two of these mutations, which the nasty strain could acquire by reassortment.
Could this really happen? "We found that it's certainly within the realms of possibility," says Smith, whose team has investigated how easy it might be for the virus to mutate in this way.
This sounds extremely alarming, but there are two big "buts". Firstly, while 60 per cent of people hospitalised with H5N1 bird flu have died, Fouchier thinks that many mild infections have gone undetected, meaning it is not as deadly as it appears.
Secondly, while it might not take many mutations for H5N1 to become more infectious, the same mutations could well make the virus less deadly, Smith says. The reason is that deadlier strains tend to target cells deep in the lung, damaging the alveoli and causing people to essentially drown in their own bodily fluid. By contrast, seasonal flu viruses generally infect only the upper respiratory tract. This makes them both less deadly – because they don't damage the lungs – and more infectious, because viruses shed from the upper airways are thought to exit the body more easily and don't have to travel as deeply into the bodies of other people before reaching cells they can infect.
Deadly H5N1 bird flu continues to circulate in wild and domestic birds (Image: Hoang Dinh Nam/AFP/Getty Images)
So when bird flu viruses mutate to target the upper respiratory tract, they may become less deadly. But even if this process reduced the lethality of an airborne virus by 10 or even 100 times, it would still be thoroughly nasty, Smith says, killing perhaps 1 in 200 people – on the scale of the 1918 Spanish flu pandemic.
And this is as much as we know for now. While it seldom makes headlines any more, the threat from bird flu certainly hasn't gone away. In fact, it has grown worse. Not only is H5N1 still circulating in wild and domestic birds, but a nasty new H7N9 bird flu emerged in 2013. "Based on what we know, it would require only a little bit of tweaking to acquire airborne transmissibility," says Fouchier.
If it did, could we stop a 1918-style virus rampaging around the world? The vaccine for 2009 H1N1 swine flu arrived only after the first wave of infections around the globe, but Fouchier thinks we might do better next time. "If we recognise the threat very, very early, there's a good chance we'd be able to protect some of the at-risk groups in time," he says. "We certainly should be able to protect everybody for the second wave."
So Fouchier and Smith think the death toll from pandemic flu will never be as high as 1918. Fraser thinks otherwise: we can't assume that a virus with similar properties won't emerge in future, he says. "And there is little evidence that we could effectively control the global spread of such a virus."

Devastating impact

The number of deaths is also only part of the story. The Ebola outbreak may only have killed 10,000, but the impact on the most-affected countries has been devastating. Whole countries have been shut down for days at a time, with borders closed, regions quarantined, schools shut for months and flights cancelled. Nearly half of workers were unable to earn a living even as food prices rose. Developed countries may be even more vulnerable to this kind of disruption, as their societies are so much more complex and interdependent.
For those who fear a sci-fi-style apocalyptic plague, though, the idea that the biggest threat is a rerun of the 1918 flu pandemic may be reassuring. But no one can be sure what's coming next. "Viruses are unpredictable," says Fouchier. "There will always be new ones that come when they're least expected."
And while it doesn't seem likely, the possibility that we'll find ourselves facing a particularly nasty one cannot be ruled out. "It is feasible to imagine worse epidemics than we have experienced in the last century," says Fraser. "I would advocate preparing for such eventualities."
It is not just wild viruses we need to worry about. Fouchier's tinkering with H5N1 triggered a storm of controversy: might the engineered viruses start a pandemic if there was a slip-up in the lab? Was the published work tantamount to a recipe for creating a terrible bioweapon? There are good grounds for concern. The 1977 flu pandemic was probably caused by the escape of an old human flu strain from a lab, for instance.
The furore over Fouchier's work has led to an effective ban on this kind of flu research for now, but flu is not the only threat. In 2001, New Scientist revealed that biologists had accidentally created an extremely deadly version of a rabbit virus. In 2003, "biodefence" researchers in the US deliberately altered a mouse virus in this way. Could a deadly virus capable of spreading in people be created accidentally or deliberately, and somehow escape the lab? Let's hope we never find out.

Wednesday, May 6, 2015

Tracing the Ebola Outbreak, Scientists Hunt a Silent Epidemic

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Continue reading the main storyVideo

Sierra Leone’s Hidden Ebola Outbreak

Sheri Fink, a New York Times reporter, recounts her discovery that Sierra Leone’s outbreak started much earlier than the official story suggests. An exclusive video by the PBS series “Frontline.”
 By PBS Frontline on Publish DateMay 5, 2015. 
Scientists are using blood samples collected throughout the Ebola outbreak to map the virus’s spread from country to country by tracking tiny mutations in its gene sequences.
The picture is not yet complete, but intriguing discoveries have been made. Virus mutations first detected in Sierra Leone last spring were found later in Liberia and Mali, and scientists are examining whether this resulted from the chance movements of people across borders.
While some scientists think it is unlikely that the mutations made a difference in how the virus functioned, others are looking at whether this version of the virus had properties that made it more capable of causing infection.
Scientists look for viral mutations because of their potential influence on the effectiveness of diagnostics or treatments. Researchers have changedEbola diagnostic tests and experimental treatments based on information about how the virus has evolved from previous outbreaks to the one in West Africa.
Genetic mutations are also beginning to serve as a tool to understand the overall course of the epidemic, which could offer insights into how to improve the response to outbreaks. “They let us trace history,” said Daniel J. Park, group leader of viral computational genomics at the Broad Institute of M.I.T. and Harvard.
Tracking changes in the virus’s genetic sequence is an objective endeavor, unlike interviewing people on the ground. “We can tell you with a high likelihood that this sequence is derived from this other sequence,” said Jeffrey R. Kugelman, the chief of the bioinformatics branch of the Center for Genomic Sciences at the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases.
But epidemiologists’ interviews rely heavily “on the quality of your conversations with people, and whether they’re telling the truth and whether they understood the situation properly,” he said.
Still, making sense of the scientific evidence from sequencing relies on good records about where and when samples were taken. Both strategies are needed to tell a full story, said Edward C. Holmes, a fellow at the University of Sydney in Australia.
Sequences of viruses from only about 250 people were made publicly available during the first year of the outbreak in West Africa, which is thought to have infected 25,000. Scientists have assigned the sequences to three clusters plus the original versions of the virus discovered in Guinea in March 2014. The three clusters are slightly mutated descendants of the Guinean viruses, and they were found circulating in Sierra Leone two to three months later.
One of the most intriguing findings so far is that viral descendants of what is known as Cluster 2 have been found in the blood samples of all LiberianEbola patients whose viruses have been sequenced and made public, and inpatients in Mali who had traveled from and lived in Guinea.
Based on scientific publications, documents and interviews with people in Sierra Leone, Cluster 2 was first detected in blood drawn on May 23 from Victoria Yillia, one of the country’s first confirmed Ebola patients.
According to interviews with Ms. Yillia, who survived, and her relatives and neighbors in eastern Sierra Leone, people with symptoms of Ebola had already been dying for well over two months as the outbreak went unrecognized by the authorities. Some of them crossed over to Liberia and Guinea, they said.
Sierra Leone’s silent epidemic of illness and death can be traced back to late February 2014, with the sickness of a woman named Sia Wanda Koniono. She became ill in the Kailahun District when she returned to the country after traveling in Guinea, according to people close to her. Ms. Koniono crossed back to Guinea for medical treatment and died there. Others exposed to her there were later confirmed to have Ebola, said Dr. Michel Van Herp of Doctors Without Borders.
A report by officers working for the World Health Organization and Guinea, which has not been made public, shows that officials there knew in March about Ms. Koniono’s death from hemorrhagic fever and the illness of her daughter. But no one followed up on this information by tracing their contacts across the border in Sierra Leone, according to local officials.
Doctors Without Borders staff members said in interviews that they, too, had known about Ms. Koniono, and that one worker had sent an email attachment mentioning her to Dr. Sheik Humarr Khan, then the point person for viral hemorrhagic diseases in Kenema, Sierra Leone, in late March, and to a laboratory worker there in early April. But those emails were not answered and may never have been opened, the laboratory worker said, because Internet connections were intermittent. Dr. Khan later died of Ebola.
By sequencing more blood samples taken in Guinea at important times, scientists say it may be possible to determine whether Ms. Yillia’s version of the virus arose in Sierra Leone during the months when the virus was probably spreading there silently and then reseeded Liberia and Guinea, ultimately becoming a dominant version of the virus in those countries.
“This sort of dramatic change in the virus population could be explained by chance,” said Dr. Pardis Sabeti, a Harvard professor and computational biologist at the Broad Institute.
Still, she said, her lab and others are studying the function of the virus, trying to see whether the mutations might have made that version of the virus more capable of infecting people just at the time the epidemic exploded.
“The genome of the virus is so small, and this outbreak so devastating,” Dr. Sabeti said, “as a scientific community, we should leave no stone unturned.”
A sequencing laboratory was recently set up in Liberia with support from the Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases because of delays in transporting Ebola samples across borders. In future outbreaks, sequencing at diagnostic laboratories in affected countries could “become an important tool for seeing what is going on as it happens,” said Andrew Rambaut of the Institute of Evolutionary Biology at the University of Edinburgh. But, he said, “it will need an expectation that data will be shared immediately.”
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